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uman rights presuppose moral equality among humans; 
in turn, moral equality is usually accounted on the basis 
of our dignity, which constitutes the status demanding 
recognition and respect. In most accounts of the 
grounds for moral equality and human rights, dignity is 
singled out as the core of the human worth, the kernel of our 
common humanity. Sangiovanni disputes this prevalent account, 
carefully criticizing the three main views on dignity (ch. 1), namely 
the Aristocratic view (from Aristotle, to Cicero, to Baldassar 
Castiglione), the Christian view and the Kantian view. Then he 
presents his alternative (ch. 2), based on a negative approach to the 
issue, by means of analyzing and reflecting on the reactive attitudes 
governing the practices of treating others as inferiors. From such 
reflection, it emerges that cruelty is the wrong displayed in the 
different ways of treating others as inferior, and cruelty is defined 
as the unauthorized and wrongful use of others’ vulnerability to 
attack or obliterate people’s capacity to develop and maintain an 
integral sense of self. Then he takes up a thorough analysis of 
discrimination in order to illustrate how social cruelty works in 
demeaning, obliterating and deleting the sense of self of the 
discriminated persons (ch. 3). 
In the second part of the book, Sangiovanni turns to human 
rights, looking for a concept that is consistent with the previous 
H 
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discussion of moral equality and of the harm produced by 
inferiorizing treatments. In line with his argumentative approach 
of the first part, he defines human rights in the negative, as “those 
moral rights whose systematic violations ought to be of universal, 
legal and political concern”; thus, violations engendering universal 
concern are the way by means of which human rights can be 
asserted (ch. 4). Equipped with this concept, he then proceeds 
discussing some central topics in the philosophical discussion of 
human rights, namely the moral bases of international human right 
and the distinction between basic1 or, better, fundamental from 
non-fundamental rights (ch. 5). Finally, he wonders whether we 
have an obligation to pursue the protection offered by human 
rights at the international level and to embody such protection in 
a system of international norms (ch. 6). His point is that human 
rights are primarily meant to protect people from attack on their 
equal moral status by a display of social cruelty. This approach 
allows him to answer to many open questions regarding human 
rights, for example which are fundamental and hierarchically prior 
to others, while it offers a philosophical depth to purely legal and 
political approaches, focused on the enforcement and on the list 
of the human rights we have. I think that the moral equality 
perspective, forcefully put forward by Sangiovanni, is indeed the 
key to understand and sustain the international system of human 
rights, and much more than other approaches to global justice, 
such as luck egalitarianism or utilitarianism, makes sense of what is 
intolerable in certain circumstances of life beyond poverty and 
deprivation. 
Even if one should be cautious to call a philosophical book 
beautiful, I think that Humanity without Dignity properly deserves 
such qualification. Not only it displays rigor and clarity in 
 
1 H. Shue (1996), Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996). 
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developing the complex and interrelated arguments, and not only 
it advances an original thesis concerning the grounding of human 
rights, but it is also beautifully written and shows a mastering of 
classical texts and literature which is unusual in an analytical work. 
The result is an enrichment of the argumentation with historical 
depth and literary examples, which makes the reading truly 
enjoyable. The book is well thought through in all its parts, and is 
rich of insights of many subjects, from methodology to applied 
ethics, from metaethics to legal philosophy, each of which will 
deserve a proper analysis and consideration. I shall however 
confine my discussion to the first part of the book, to the 
philosophical and moral framework where the issue of human right 
is located and to Sangiovanni’s original argument against dignity. 
More precisely, I shall focus on the notion of the integral sense of 
self, and on its role in the architecture of the argument, and on the 
view of respect as opacity respect.  
Let us start considering his negative approach to moral equality. 
Instead of looking for the common property in which human 
worth consists, Sangiovanni, provisionally assuming moral 
equality, examines its violations and wonders what is wrong about 
them. All major forms of treating people as inferior (stigmatizing, 
dehumanizing, infantilizing, objectifying, instrumentalizing) share 
social cruelty as their common denominator, and what defines 
cruelty is not just the harm and the injuries produced, but the 
correlated demeaning attitude for cruelty aims at attacking or 
destroying the integral sense of self, taking advantage of others’ 
vulnerability. Thus, it is the integral sense of self the fundamental 
good and crucial interest shared by all human beings, beyond their 
different capacities, circumstances and projects. This notion, 
which is reached through the negative approach, is able to satisfy 
the two desiderata which the grounding of moral equality should 
respond to (and which dignity fails to satisfy), insofar as it explains 
a) why we are morally equal (equality desideratum) and b) why 
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moral equality is worthy and should be protected by rights 
(rationale desideratum). The alternative to dignity is therefore not 
another property, supposedly, common to all human beings, but it 
is rather the central human interest to develop and preserve a sense 
of self, which in turn needs to be socially recognized. Any 
functioning social agent must have an integral sense of self and 
receive social recognition for that is necessary in any kind of social 
interaction. The grounds of moral equality is not the kernel of 
human value shining inside any human being, but rather what we 
most care about, which makes us all vulnerable to wrongful 
violations hence requires protection via moral rights. The rejection 
of social cruelty, implicit in all inferiorizing treatments threatening 
the integral sense of self, calls for respect and moral rights. 
Sangiovanni thinks to have disposed in this way of the main 
difficulty concerning the possession of the property that makes us 
digni, worthy of equal consideration and respect, namely the actual 
variations in rational capacity and rational deliberations, capacity 
which in some human beings (small children, severely disabled 
individuals, victims of Alzheimer and senile dementia) is actually 
absent.  
Moral equality requires that the reciprocal relationship within 
the moral and social community be governed by respect. The kind 
of respect relevant for Sangiovanni is “recognition-respect”, 
according to a well-known distinction by Stephen Darwall2, that is, 
the respect that unconditionally we owe each other just as (equally 
vulnerable) human beings, and not the “appraisal-respect” which 
is attributed on the basis of achievements and merits and is not 
equal. Moreover, the recognition-respect here in order is also 
“opacity-respect”3 for it implies restraint confronting others, 
 
2 Darwall, Stephen (1977), “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88 (1977): 39-49. 
3 Cf. I. Carter, “Respect and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics 121 (2011), pp. 538-
571. 
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keeping the right distance to protect the self-presentation of other 
people without exposing them to inquisitiveness, rudeness and 
discomfort. Within this framework, discrimination is wrong not 
only because it unjustly disadvantages members of socially salient 
groups and exposes them to prejudices and biases, but because 
discriminatory acts express attitudes which are demeaning and 
disrespectful, hence undermine the moral equality of its victims. In 
order to judge an act of discrimination as demeaning, it is crucial 
to refer to the social meaning expressed by the act, whether 
intentionally or not. The social meaning of an act is an objective 
property, expressing the underlying attitude in the background of 
a given network of social standards and conventions, whether or 
not the agent intended to express that attitude. Acts of 
discrimination are thus understood not simply as disadvantageous 
or prejudiced, but implying attitudes of contempt, stigmatization 
or objectification of the target of discrimination. This expressive 
account of discrimination, which Sangiovanni shows it is capable 
to accommodate indirect discrimination, implicit bias as well as 
reverse discrimination, picks up the disrespect dimension as the 
crucial one for impairing the moral equality and attack the capacity 
to preserve an integral sense of self, beside limiting opportunity for 
individuals and keeping oppressed groups in a marginal position.  
Generally speaking, the negative approach used by Sangiovanni 
has clearly advantages on alternatives when dealing with human 
values, a highly sensitive area for disagreement. While it is usually 
difficult to agree on the priority of a single value and on its 
grounding reason, it is easier to find agreement on the intolerability 
of the violation of a given value, and the reactive attitudes to 
violations provide precious guide to single out a special value on 
which we could agree by implication. Yet, here is precisely the 
critical point I’d like to raise: why is it that the value or fundamental 
good that the intolerable violation to our moral equality points to 
is the integral sense of self, instead of dignity? I understand that 
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dignity cannot be the starting point for the argument in favor of 
equal human right, for dignity, literally, means that human beings 
are worthy (digni) but it requires an account of a) why we are 
worthy, in virtue of what property, and b) how come we are all 
equally worthy. The answer to these two issues is a matter of 
disagreement among students of dignity and Sangiovanni believes 
that none of the responses in the three traditions of dignity is 
satisfactory (on this I shall come back in a moment). Consequently, 
he takes the different negative route to moral equality. In this way, 
he is able to establish that inferiorizing treatments, taking 
advantage of human vulnerability, are socially cruel, hence moral 
equality ought to be presupposed to make sense of our reactive 
attitudes. Yet, at this point, why is it that the inferiorizing treatment 
attacks the integrity of our sense of self, instead of our dignity? It 
seems to me that the greatest good of the integral sense of self does 
not necessarily follow from the intolerability of social cruelty and 
of inferiorizing treatments. To be sure, Sangiovanni makes a good 
case for the importance of having a sense of self, yet it is another 
thing to show that it is the greatest and primary good. Why cannot 
the sense of self be the sense of one’s worth, hence of one’s 
dignity? I conjecture that his reason to favor the sense of self over 
dignity lies in the two issues linked to dignity above mentioned. 
The first issue is to specify what the human worth consists in, what 
is the special human value in virtue of which all human beings have 
dignity, and the answer is usually found in the rational capacity, 
both in the Christian and in the Kantian tradition, though 
differently specified. The second issue is precisely connected with 
this answer, for, first, the rational capacity is not present in all 
human beings equally, and, second, in some of them, like in the 
severely mentally handicapped or in very small children, is absent. 
Thus, it seems that dignity cannot be the ground for moral equality. 
I think however that similar issues can be raised in relation to the 
integral sense of self. Sangiovanni’s argument is based on the 
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difference between a property that all of us should possess, and the 
crucial center of our care and concern. The latter does not 
presuppose equal intellectual and moral capacity, and everyone, no 
matter how clever and morally accomplished, cares about oneself. 
Yet here the issue emerges in relation of what is meant for caring 
about oneself. For, if it is understood as the instinct of self-
preservation, definitely, this is something that we all share, but also 
something that goes beyond humanity, encompassing all living 
beings. Sangiovanni does not take this route; by caring about 
oneself, he meant something more distinctly human, namely the 
capacity of seeing oneself, and of constructing and reconstructing 
one’s image according to what we want to be, as well as the capacity 
to present oneself to others for being socially recognized. It is part 
of an integral sense of self also the gap between how we see 
ourselves and how we want to be seen, which is often a reason for 
self-improvement, as well as the reason to limit our social 
exposure. Clearly though, caring for the integral sense of self 
implies the capacity of developing, revising and reshaping our 
images according to our commitments and wishes. And not all 
human beings share this capacity in the same measure across the 
board. Young children have not yet developed a sense of self and 
people with severe mental handicaps or disabilities may have lost 
or never have had a proper sense of self. Even among adult 
persons normally endowed with rational and moral capabilities, not 
everyone makes the center of one’s care the sense of self in the 
same way. Briefly, not everyone has a proper integral sense of self, 
some are more divided, and some are alienated, and not necessarily 
as the effect of violations or unfavorable circumstances, but also 
of diminished capacity or of mental illness or handicaps. Thus, it 
seems to me that the issues connected with grounding moral 
equality on dignity, in a way, resurface here. For no matter what 
the grounds for moral equality, the problems of a) human 
variations and b) of human beings that are not autonomous 
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persons in the proper sense arise and cannot easily be disposed, 
even adopting a negative approach.  
The problem of human variations, whether concerning the 
capacity of rational agency or of an integral sense of self, has been, 
to my mind, satisfactorily responded with reference to the range 
property. The range property is “a non-variable property (it either 
exists or does not exist) that supervenes on a particular range of 
variation of a variable property”4. The equal status of persons, 
therefore, does not depend on a given degree of certain abilities, 
but rather in their (presumed) presence above a minimal threshold. 
If only a minimal degree of those abilities is required for the range 
property to be present, then, in normal circumstances, all adults are 
endowed with it, hence are worth the status of equal. Carter 
referred the range property to rational and moral capacities, but 
there is no reason preventing it from applying to the sense of self. 
Sangiovanni too hastily dismisses the range property argument 
because he says that it is still to be explained why the equal 
possession of the range property should count more than the 
unequal possession of the underlying property in the highest 
degree. I think that the answer can be found in Sangiovanni own’s 
argument. He has explained that the way to get to the basis of 
equality, i.e. the sense of self --expressed in a range property, 
following my suggestion-- is through our reactive responses to its 
violations, to the various forms of inferiorizing treatments, from 
humiliation to infantilization and objectification. From there we 
arrive at the intolerability of the social cruelty underlying such kind 
of treatments, and to the crucial importance of the sense of self. 
The responsive attitudes to violations are actually independent 
from how deep and articulated is the sense of self, whether it is the 
product of autonomous reflection or induced by social 
conditioning. For, it is from outside that we react to the violations, 
 
4 Ibid. 
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hence the sense of self of the violated is ascribed from outside. 
Therefore, it does not count whether it is the display of autonomy 
or not, for no one undergoes any test as to the possession of a 
proper sense of self (as well as to the possession of the rational and 
moral capacities). In that sense, it is a range property, which we 
presume present in everyone and which make us indignant at its 
violations. Sometimes, however, our ascription of the range 
property is later revised, for example, when we realized that the 
individual we are confronting is struck by dementia and has no idea 
of who she is and where she is. This lead us to the second issue of 
moral equality, however grounded, namely the fact that some 
human beings are not autonomous and seem deprived of the 
capacity of having a sense of self as well as the rational and moral 
capacity above a certain threshold. Here, again, I think that 
Sangiovanni’s negative approach can be helpful: if the starting 
point are the violations and our consequent reactive attitudes, the 
latter are even stronger the more vulnerable is the victim. This 
establishes the moral status of the victim, no matter if deprived of 
an integral sense of self, for the victim is the recipient of our 
reactive attitudes, of our care and affection and capable to 
reciprocate our affection and love. Such moral status deserves 
protection by rights and respect by us, though rights and respect 
are not equal insofar as these individuals are not recognized as 
autonomous. They will not have certain rights, those presupposing 
agential capacity, such as political rights or right to sign valid 
contracts, but they have full title to human fundamental rights. 
Similarly, treating them in protective ways is not an instance of 
disrespect, of infantilization, for they are not autonomous persons, 
but an instance of our care for them and for their well-being. If 
there is a moral duty to guide, supervise and provide for the well-
being of children and people with mental and neurological 
disabilities, we still ought to respect them: they have a right not to 
be demeaned, degraded, instrumentalized and stigmatized. 
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Whenever someone is taking advantage of their vulnerability to 
make fun or mistreat them, that counts as a gross violation of their 
moral status. 
In sum, I think that the negative approach to moral equality, 
focused first on violations, represents a real advantage of 
Sangiovanni’s work compared with more traditional views, starting 
with the value of dignity. Yet, I also think that the shift to the 
integral sense of self, as the central concern of human beings, does 
not prevent the emergence of two issues that affected dignity, as 
the core value of any person, namely the issue of human variation 
and that of individuals with diminished sense of self or deprived 
of it. I have argued that the first issue can be addressed by the range 
property and that the second by the recognition that there are 
human beings who have moral status but not equal moral status, 
entitled to respect and rights but not equal respect and equal rights. 
The negative approach adopted by Sangiovanni can indeed help 
making both arguments, but, in my view, it does not change if the 
grounds of moral equality is dignity or the integral sense of self, at 
least once dignity is not assumed as the prior value but as the arrival 
point of a negative argument proceeding from violations. 
A second point of Sangiovanni’s argument I want to discuss 
concerns opacity respect, which he owes to Ian Carter5. Carter’s 
position can be summarized as follows: equal recognition respect 
is attributed to anyone, on the (presumptive) possession of the 
range property; in this sense, it is unconditional and independent 
of the actual capacities of people. Yet, just because it is equally 
ascribed, it requires opacity as to the content of any person's actual 
capacities. In other words, if respect is to be equal and ascribed on 
the basis of the range property, then it must keep the right distance 
between people, and dispense with scrutinizing others as to the 
 
5 Ibid. 
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti – How we are morally equal and how we ought to respect each other 
39 
 
exact degree of range property possessed. Sangiovanni elaborates 
from this idea differently: “When you respect someone as a person, 
you do not treat who they are, what they have done, or where they 
come from as relevant to your interaction with them. To respect in 
this way is, therefore, to treat the contingent aspects of their life 
and situation as opaque (unless we have been authorized to do 
otherwise)…”(88) If moral equality is ultimately grounded in 
having (developing and preserving) an integral sense of self, then 
respect is a kind of restraint from coming too close to people’s 
sense of self. Such distance is required for protecting the sense of 
self from violations, from social cruelty. A common and daily 
violation is being exposed to the public gaze without our consent. 
“When we respect someone as a person, we yield to them 
specifically as self-presenters, as individuals who have a self-
conscious perspective on both the world and their place in it, and 
a basic desire for recognition of that perspective by others similarly 
placed” (89). While for Carter, opacity-respect is required by being 
respected as equals without inquiring into our actual capability, in 
Sangiovanni opacity is required as protection from social cruelty. 
Exposure makes us vulnerable and vulnerability incites 
inferiorizing treatments. Thus, in order to avoid violation to our 
equal moral status, we should restrain from getting too close to 
others, and keeping distance is what opacity respect consists in.  
So presented, it seems that opacity respect is a sort of 
precommitment against violations of moral equality, violations 
which would be tempting once the fog is lifted from other people’s 
life and circumstances.6 It is certainly true that certain kinds of 
unauthorized exposure is disrespectful, but is this sufficient for 
characterizing all there is to respect for persons as opacity and 
distance? Suppose that you are in a hospital as a patient, and 
 
6 Cf. J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
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suppose that doctors and nurses walk in your room, look at your 
clinical records and exams, take your temperature and blood 
pressure and, without chit-chatting with you, discuss your case 
among themselves. Certainly, you as a person, with your integral 
sense of self, have been thoroughly opaque to them; yet is this an 
instance of respectful treatment? I guess that all of us would find 
such a situation patronizing and demeaning of our being persons, 
an unfair taking advantage of our vulnerable situation as patients. 
It is easy to recall many other familiar examples of treatments by 
administrative officers or bureaucrats, who consider people just as 
numbers and cases, falling into this category of daily disrespect. In 
a way, they are minor violations of our equal moral status, and yet 
they are acts taking advantage of our vulnerability treating us as 
inferiors, despite keeping distance from people. Therefore, not all 
opaque treatments are instances of respect for persons, nor is 
respect specifically characterized as opacity. Actually, respect for 
persons as persons, is a form of recognition-respect, according to 
the well-known distinction by Steven Darwall,7 which Sangiovanni 
subscribes. And, as recognition-respect, it always implies 
recognition of the person as a person and as an equal.  
What an act of recognition, in order to attribute respect, 
consists in actually varies, according to the circumstances. Respect, 
not being an actual “thing”, it is always attributed indirectly 
through different actions symbolizing respect.8 But, while 
respectful actions vary in different contexts, they are always 
accompanied by an attitude of regard for the other person which 
precisely represents the recognition element in respect. The 
 
7 Cf. S. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” and Id., “Respect and the Second 
Person Standpoint,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 78 (2005): 43-59. 
8 Cf. A. E. Galeotti, “Respect as Recognition. Some Political Implications,” in 
M. Seymour (ed.), The Plural States of Recognition, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 
UK, 2010, 78-97. 
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attitude of regard implicit in acts of recognition respect is actually, 
in Sangiovanni own phrasing, the objective aspect of the action 
expressing the correspondent social meaning. Sangiovanni 
introduces the notion of objective social meanings, in the 
background of social standards and conventions, in relation to 
discriminatory acts. Yet the same very notion can apply to 
respectful acts so that an act counts as respectful if it objectively 
expresses an attitude of regard according to the social standards 
and convention of a particular context. Sangiovanni seems to 
acknowledge this dimension when he speaks of the basic human 
need of social recognition, but somehow he does not elaborate this 
further and does not ask himself how the basic interest for social 
recognition can be reconciled with opacity respect, implying a 
distance among people.  
Actually, I think that one of the violation of the equal moral 
status of persons, and an attack on their sense of self, aimed at 
inferiorizing others, is invisibility, which, curiously enough, does 
not figure in the list of forms of inferiorizing treatment analyzed 
by Sangiovanni. A typical way of keeping groups and segments of 
society in an inferior and dependent position is that of keeping 
them publicly invisible, maybe closing them in ghettoes, outside 
the public sight, or dismissing their presence as with servants 
assisting at a dinner party as statues. Most groups subject to 
historical oppression and domination have been made (or treated 
as) invisible symbolically and sometimes even literal. Women, 
homosexual, indigenous people, servants and poor, all have been 
considered and made invisible in front of the ruling class of white 
Christian heterosexual men of substance. Now that all those 
groups have been admitted to the clubs of persons, at least in the 
abstract, and are in principle endowed with equal rights, would 
opacity represent respect towards them? Is it not the case that 
respecting them as persons, via obscuring their life and 
circumstances, bracketing the latter as irrelevant, implies 
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reproducing their invisibility qua members of their group? Is it not 
a way of recognizing them as person only beyond who they are and 
in a way dispensing with their membership in the oppressed group?  
In order to address this problem, I shall make use of Darwall’s 
idea of respect as second-person.9 The second-personal dimension 
of respect means to acknowledge that respect-claims are 
reciprocally advanced to each other as valid source of horizontal 
moral authority. I would push this idea further, stating that the 
second person dimension of respect involves also a specific quality 
of the act of recognition attributing respect.10 If I respect you as a 
specimen of an end in itself, independently from who you are, I 
respect you in virtue of third-person morality, which implies 
opacity, but also does away with any attitude of regard for you. Yet, 
the opposite would be likewise unsatisfactory: respecting you, just 
because it is you, in virtue of the special contingent relationship 
between us, does not capture recognition respect properly, for we 
want to be respected by anyone in any social encounter. We want 
to be respected as persons. On the one hand, the emphasis on the 
particularity of the relationship may capture something there is in 
respect-claim; on the other hand, respect is a universal claim, 
advanced not in virtue of our special character, but in virtue of our 
equal moral status. 
There is actually a tension in respect-claims between 
particularity and universality, or, to put it differently, between 
recognition and opacity. Is respect attributed because looking at 
you I see an equal of mine, and recognize the equal status of 
person, or because, bracketing you as you are, I can finally see you 
as my equal? In other words, does respecting someone as a person 
mean an individualizing act of recognition of you as my pal or, 
instead, a generalizing act of the recognition of the common 
 
9 Cf. Darwall, “Respect and the Second Person Standpoint.” 
10 Cf. Galeotti, “Respect as Recognition. Some Political Implications.” 
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humanity abstracting from you? In the latter case, the recognition 
of the equal status proceeds dispensing with the special and 
particular self, as if the traits and characters of that self would 
subtract from the common humanity. It seems to me that the claim 
to be equally respected cannot be reconciled with the idea that our 
self (because of its gender, skin color, religion, social class) 
subtracts from the common humanity.  
In history, even after the eighteenth century declarations of 
rights, not everyone was right away recognized as a person 
endowed with the equal moral status and with rights, given that the 
model of the “person” was patterned after the ruling class of white, 
Christian, well educated men. Those who differed from that model 
were not considered persons in full, worth of equal respect, but in 
case only warranting paternalistic attention. In order to dispel this 
history of invisibility, the attribution of respect should not be 
opaque concerning the differential characters of minority 
members, but should imply recognizing the individual person as it 
is, neither despite nor in virtue, but given her special characters and 
identity. Only in this way, respect carries along the attitude of 
regard that always ought to accompany the act signifying respect.  
In other words, respect implies a claim to being considered and 
attended to, given that being ignored, being erased and being 
invisible are precisely forms of disrespect, and, to use 
Sangiovanni’s own phrasing of being attacked in own sense of self. 
Now the point is precisely this: can the quest of recognition, regard 
and consideration, especially crucial in case of historic 
discrimination, be reconciled with opacity respect? In a sense, 
Sangiovanni suggests such reconciliation when he says that, in 
order to respect people as persons, we have to take them as self-
presenters with their self-conscious perspective, and consider their 
quest to be recognized according to their own modes of 
presentation. (89). If I understand it well, here the opacity concerns 
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the content of the personal presentation and perspective, which 
should not be scrutinized closely and exposed unnecessarily. Such 
restraint as to the content of either the agential capacity or the 
integrity of their sense of self is however compatible with an 
individualizing act of recognition concerning the gaze of regards 
towards others. 
In sum, the richness of Sangiovanni’s argument provides 
materials for the solution of this problem, and yet I think that his 
discussion of respect with the exclusive focus on opacity easily 
risks to overlook the issue of invisibility, that is one of the most 
common and daily forms of denying others the equal status of 
persons. Obviously making someone visible to my gaze as an equal 
does not mean to expose him or her to the public sight concerning 
matters one wants to keep private. It means rather to consider 
someone as a person who has the right to choose what to expose 
and what to hide in public. Much as the public exposure of certain 
traits of character is a disrespectful attack on the integral sense of 
self, implying demeaning others, similarly the deletion of people 
with certain traits from the public sight is a denial of the sense of 
self of such people as worth of consideration and respect. More 
than that: it is a way of preventing those people from developing a 
healthy sense of self and self-respect. 
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